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NOTE
Mere Voting: Presley v. Etowah County Commission and the
Voting Rights Act of 1965
The Voting Rights Act of 19651 addressed one of the most fundamental goals of the civil rights movement: the chance to manifest political will through voting. The United States Supreme Court most recently
interpreted the Act and its relation to that goal in Presley v. Etowah
County Commission.' Since 1965, decisions in the federal courts and subsequent congressional amendments gradually had expanded the reach of
the Act, so that by the time of Presley, the Act peered substantially more
deeply into states' voting practices than it did just after enactment.' In
Presley, the Court considered for the first time whether the Act was
broad enough to encompass changes in the relative authority of elected
officials. 4
Black suffrage gained explicit constitutional protection with the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment in 1870. For nearly a century after its
enactment, however, the Fifteenth Amendment's promise of colorblind
suffrage remained a dream deferred. Not until 1965 did Congress exercise its "power to enforce [the] article by appropriate legislation," ' 6 in the
form of the Voting Rights Act.7 The Act traces its history to three postCivil War amendments that marked the first federal effort to enfranchise
blacks. Ratified in 1865, the Thirteenth Amendment' abolished slavery,
but the meaning of abolition was open to conflicting interpretations, so
that it was not clear "whether the Amendment was an end or a beginning." 9 Some observers assumed that abolition resolved in one fell swoop
the issue of race in America, while others viewed the amendment more
soberly as a requisite first step."'
1. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 445 (1965) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971,
1973 to 1973bb-1 (1988)).
2. 112 S. Ct. 820 (1992).

3. See infra notes 122-63 and accompanying text.
4. Presley, 112 S. Ct. at 824.
5. U.S. CONsT.

amend. XV.

6. Id. §2.
7. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 445.
8. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
9. ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION:
1877, at 67 (1988).

AMERICA'S UNFINISHED

REVOLUTION,

1863-

10. Id. at 66-67. For example, Congressman Cornelius Cole declared: "The one question
of the age is settled." Many Republicans believed that the Thirteenth Amendment furnished
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The Fourteenth Amendment, ratified three years later, granted full
citizenship to "[a]l persons born or naturalized in the United States.""
Section two, which reduced a state's representation in Congress to the
extent that it "denied to any of the male inhabitants" "the right to
vote,"' 2 was intended to force Southern states to choose between extending the suffrage to blacks or submitting to reduced influence in Congress.'" Although this section punished states' denial of black suffrage, it
implicitly affirmed the right to such a denial as long as states were willing
to pay the price in representation.14 That the amendment offered an in-

centive to black suffrage, instead of an outright requirement of it, reflected a political compromise: The amendment's authors deliberately
omitted a direct guarantee of black voting rights in order to ensure passage in Congress.1 5
Not until the passage of the Fifteenth Amendment in 1870 did black
suffrage gain explicit constitutional protection.' 6 The amendment, however, made no guarantee of the right to hold office, and it left in place
many of the most effective barriers to voting, such as the poll tax, literacy
tests, and property requirements.' 7 The amendment was buttressed with
the passage in 1870 and 1871 of several enforcement acts,18 that authorized the President to appoint election supervisors who could bring to trial
in federal court offenses against the right to vote. 19 These efforts met
with initial success-at the height of Reconstruction "about two-thirds
of eligible black males cast ballots" in state and national elections, and
about fifteen percent of elected officials in the South were black.2"
Owing in large part to a severe depression beginning in 1873, voters
soundly overturned the Republican congressional majority in the electhe federal government with a sufficient tool for protecting the fundamental rights of blacks as
citizens. Id. But Frederick Douglass maintained that "[s]lavery is not abolished until the
black man has the ballot," and James A. Garfield asked, "Is (freedom] the bare privilege of not
being chained? ... If this is all, then freedom is a bitter mockery, a cruel delusion." Id.
11. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
12. Id. §2.
13. FONER, supra note 9, at 254.
14. Id. at 255.
15. Id. at 257. One black lobbyist explained, "Several Congressmen tell me, 'the negro
must vote,' but the issue must be avoided now so as 'to keep up a two thirds power in Congress.' " Id. at 261.
16. U.S. CONST. amend. XV.

17. FONER, supra note 9, at 446-47.
18. See, e.g., Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140 (1870).
19. FONER, supra note 9, at 454.

20. Chandler Davidson, The Voting Rights Act: A BriefHistory, in CONTROVERSIES
MINORITY VOTING 7, 10 (Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson eds., 1992).

IN
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VOTING RIGHTS

tions of 1874.21 With the party of Reconstruction out of power in Congress, many in the North viewed the Civil War as a closed chapter in
American history, and enthusiasm for federal intervention in the South
began to wane.2 2 Soon after the Democratic ascendancy in Congress,
two 1876 decisions of the United States Supreme Court 23 "virtually gutted the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments as protectors of the black
franchise."' 24 In the 1890s Southern whites began a consolidated campaign of disfranchisement, marked by state constitutional conventions,
literacy tests, gerrymandering, intimidation, and voting fraud.2" The retreat from the ideals of Reconstruction continued inexorably during the
last decades of the nineteenth century until virtually all the progress
made in black enfranchisement after the Civil War had been
eliminated.2 6
From the turn of the century to the modem civil rights era of the
1950s and 1960s, the slow progress to regain the franchise was concentrated primarily in a handful of United States Supreme Court cases, most
notably Smith v. Allwright,27 which struck down various indirect bars to
black voting. Further progress followed in the direct precursors to the
Voting Rights Act: the Civil Rights Acts of 1957, 1960, and 1964.
These "tentative, piecemeal efforts" 28 proved no match for intransigent
white majorities, largely because they depended on ineffective case-bycase litigation brought by private citizens.29
21. FONER, supra note 9, at 523.
22. Id. at 524.
23. United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1875) (holding unconstitutional statutes prohibiting interference with the right to vote; because the statutes did not base the prohibition directly
on race, they were beyond the scope of the Fifteenth Amendment); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875) (same).
24. Davidson, supra note 20, at 10.
25. Id. at 10-11; U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE VOTING RIGHTS AcT: THE
FIRST MONTHS 6-7 (1965).

26. Davidson, supra note 20, at 11; see FONER, supra note 9, at 512-601.
27. 321 U.S. 649 (1944). In Allwright, the Court considered whether the Texas Democratic Party, as a private organization, could hold a whites-only primary. The Court held the
primary unconstitutional-the party's nominal private status did not control, since it was an
integral part of the electoral process. Id. at 664-66; see also Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S.
34, 364-677 (1915) (declaring unconstitutional Oklahoma's grandfather clause, which excused
any person who had the right to vote in 1866, or that person's descendants, from taking the
otherwise required literacy test before voting). The obvious effect of the challenged practice
was to deny voting rights to most blacks but not illiterate whites.
28. Davidson, supra note 20, at 13.
29. U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, supra note 25, at 8. The Court explained that such
private litigation was ineffective because it was "too onerous and time-consuming to prepare,
obstructionist tactics by those determined to perpetuate discrimination yielded unacceptable
delay, and even successful lawsuits too often merely resulted in a change in methods of discrimination." McCain v. Lybrand, 465 U.S. 236, 243-44 (1984).
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In response to their limited success in federal courts and in Congress, civil rights groups intensified efforts in a grass-roots campaign to
register blacks in the South in the early 1960s. 3° On March 7, 1965,
demonstrators marching from Selma to Montgomery, Alabama were met
at Selma's Edmund Pettus Bridge by state troopers and sheriff's deputies
wielding clubs, teargas, and electric cattle prods.3 ' Extensive national

press coverage of the violence that ensued created enormous public outrage and momentum for Executive action.3 2 Spurred to respond to these
events, President Lyndon Johnson presented his voting rights bill to Congress and the nation in a dramatic televised address one week later.3 3
Congress worked quickly to pass the bill that summer, and the President
3
signed the Voting Rights Act into law on August 6, 1965. 1
The remedies fashioned by the Act to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment prescribed unusually strong medicine to match the resourcefulness
with which white majorities adapted their state electoral systems to exclude minority participation.3 5 The Act's chief enforcement mechanism,
commonly known as "section five,"'3 6 held the potential to alter radically
traditional notions of federalism.37 Section five requires certain states
and political subdivisions to "preclear" all new voting regulations (i.e., to
receive the prior approval of federal authorities) before enforcing them.
This preclearance requirement is triggered by a determination that a particular state or political subdivision is "covered ' 38 by the statute. The
state or political subdivision must seek either the approval of the United
States Attorney General or, in the alternative, a declaratory judgment
30. Davidson, supra note 20, at 15.
31. Id. at 16; HUGH D. GRAHAM, THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA: ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY 1960-1992, at 165 (1990).
32. See Davidson, supra note 20, at 16,

33. Id.
34. Id. at 17.
35. See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 309 (1966) ("Congress felt itself
confronted by an insidious and pervasive evil which had been perpetuated... through unremitting and ingenious defiance of the Constitution.... [It] concluded that the unsuccessful
remedies which it had prescribed in the past would have to be replaced by sterner and more
elaborate measures. .. ").
36. Section 5 of the Act is codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1988).
37. See infra notes 131-34 and accompanying text.
38. Covered jurisdictions are those: (1) which the Attorney General has determined
maintained on November 1, 1972, any "test or device" with respect to voting and (2) where
less than 50% of voting-age citizens were registered or less than 50% actually voted in the
Presidential election of November 1972, according to the Census Bureau's determination. 42
U.S.C. § 1973b(b) (1988). The states and subdivisions covered by the original Act of 1965
were exclusively Southern. The subsequent amendments to the Act extended coverage to several non-Southern jurisdictions. For a list of covered jurisdictions, including date of coverage,
see 28 C.F.R. § 51 (App. 1991).
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from the District Court for the District of Columbia holding the rule

nondiscriminatory.39 If a plaintif' believes a particular rule should
have been subjected to preclearance, he must bring his claim before a
three-judge panel of the local federal district court; appeal from such a
judgment lies directly to the United States Supreme Court.41 To determine whether the proposed rule is new or different, the reviewing court
must compare it to the rule in effect in that jurisdiction on November 1,
1964.42
This "uncommon exercise" 43 of federal power over substantive state
law has proved to be the cornerstone of the Act's remarkable success
because it removed what had been the insurmountable barrier of bringing
a separate suit against every new discriminatory voting rule only after it
had become effective.' With section five's preclearance rule, the designated federal authorities can preempt any discriminatory voting practice
by keeping it off the books in the first place.
While it has become widely apparent that the preclearance procedure is a powerful federal tool, it has never been clear exactly what constitutes a "standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting" 45 so
as to invoke the preclearance requirement. During its most recent term,
the United States Supreme Court probed the outer limits of section five
coverage in Presley v. Etowah County Commission." The Court held that
a reallocation of power among elected officials is not sufficient by itself to
require preclearance because it has "no direct relation to, or impact on,
voting."'47 This decision stands in contrast to the Court's earlier opinions, which suggested that section five should be interpreted broadly.
Ever since section five first survived a constitutional challenge, in South
39. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1988).
40. The plaintiff may be either the Attorney General or a private litigant. 42 U.S.C.

§ 1973a(b) (1988); see also infra note 136 (describing the Court's interpretation of the Act to
allow private parties standing to sue).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1988) ("Any action under this section shall be heard and determined by a court of three judges in accordance with the provisions of section 2284 of title 28

and any appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court."); see also Allen v. State Bd.of Elections, 393
U.S. 544, 560-63 (1969) (upholding the three-judge requirement).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1988). If a significant change has alreadybeen made since November 1, 1964, it may be the appropriate standard. Presley, 112 S. Ct. at 825. For example, if a
jurisdiction precleared significant changes to its voting procedures in 1972, the proper standard
for review would be the approved 1972 procedures, not the 1964 rules.
43. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 334 (1966).
44. See SENATE JUDICIARY COMM., VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965-ExTENsION, S. REP.
No. 295, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 11-12 (1975), reprintedin 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. 774, 777-78.
45. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1988).
46. 112 S.Ct. 820 (1992).

47. Id. at 830; see infra notes 52-111 and accompanying text.

574
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Carolina v. Katzenbach,48 a steady stream of federal cases, as well as
amendments to the Act,49 have gradually expanded the scope of section

five." These cases and statutory provisions require section five
preclearance of state and local actions not limited literally to voting or
election procedures.

1

This Note charts the previous expansion of sec-

tion five jurisprudence, asks why the buck stopped with Presley, and considers whether the case has redirected section five toward new goals.

Presley, originating in the Middle District of Alabama,5 2 consolidated claims that two county commissions violated the Voting Rights
Act by failing to seek section five preclearance for changes in the relative
authority of their members and appointees.

3

The first alleged change

involved the Etowah County Commission, whose primary duty was to
construct and maintain all county roads. 4 Prior to 1986, the Etowah
County Commission had consisted of four white members elected at
large from residency districts. 5 A federal district court found that this
system violated section two of the Voting Rights Act because it unlawfully diluted black voting strength." In response to this holding, the parties entered into a consent decree providing, inter alia, for each member
57
of the commission to be elected solely by the voters of his own district.

The decree also provided for the creation of two new districts, whose
representatives would have "all the rights, privileges, duties, and immunities of the other commissioners." 58
48. 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966).
49. Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-205, 96 Stat. 134 (1982);
Pub. L. No. 94-73, 89 Stat. 402 (1975); Voting Rights Act Amendment of 1970, Pub. L. No.
91-285, 84 Stat. 314 (1970).
50. See infra notes 122-63 and accompanying text.
51. But see Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976) (only holding prior to Presley
restricting the scope of § 5). See infra notes 152-56 and accompanying text for a discussion of
Beer.
52. Jurisdictional Statement for the Appellant at A-I, Presley v. Etowah County

Comm'n, 112 S. Ct. 820 (1992) (No. 90-711). The entire state of Alabama is a covered jurisdiction under the Act. 28 C.F.R. § 51 (App. 1991).
53. Presley, 112 S.Ct. at 822.
54. Id. at 825.
55. Brief for Appellants at 2-4, Presley (No. 90-711).
56. Dillard v. Crenshaw County, 640 F. Supp. 1347 (M.D. Ala. 1986). At-large voting
has the potential to disperse black votes among the white majority, thus preventing election of
any black members. See Chandler Davidson & George Korbel, At-Large Elections and Minority Group Representation,in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION 65-81 (Chandler Davidson ed., 1984);
see also infra note 178 (providing an example of the discriminatory potential of changing from
district to at-large voting).
57. Presley, 112 S.Ct. at 825 (citing Dillard v. Crenshaw County, CA No. 85-T-1332-N
(M.D. Ala. Nov. 12, 1986)).
58. Jurisdictional Statement for the Appellant at A-5, Presley (No. 90-711).
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One of the new districts established by the consent decree contained
a black majority, and Lawrence Presley, who is black, was elected as its
first commissioner.5 9 Before Presley's election to the Etowah County
Commission, each member had exercised exclusive control over the road

funds earmarked for his district,60 deciding what road projects to undertake, whom to hire, promote, and with whom to contract. 61 When the
change to district voting enabled Presley to be elected the county's first
black commissioner, the four white incumbents "refused to yield any of
their . . .power[ ]" over road and bridge operations in the county.62
Instead, the commission passed two resolutions, 63 both over Presley's objections, without clearing them as voting changes under section five.'
The "Road Supervision Resolution" provided that the four white
incumbent commissioners, who had been elected before the commission
expanded, would retain control over the road funds according to the old
district lines.6 5 Thus, the two new commissioners had no control over
spending on projects benefitting their constituents. Presley was assigned
instead the custodial duties of "oversee[ing] ...the repair, maintenance,
and operation of the Etowah County Courthouse. "66
The "Common Fund Resolution," passed the same day, shifted control over each district's funds from that district's representative to the
commission as a whole.67 Each commissioner, including Presley, gave
up individual control over intradistrict spending, which would now be
subject to a majority vote of the entire commission. 68 Thus, although the
consent decree had enabled Presley's black-majority district to elect a
black commissioner, these two resolutions made the spending of any road
funds in that district subject to a majority vote of the white-controlled
commission.
The alleged violation of the Act that formed the basis of the second
claim in Presley involved the Russell County Commission, which in 1985
had entered into a consent decree similar to that resolving the Etowah
59. Presley, 112 S.Ct. at 825.
60. Id.
61. Brief for Appellants at 9, Presley (No. 90-711).
62. Id. at 6.
63. Jurisdictional Statement for the Appellant at A-18-21, Presley (No. 90-711).
64. Since Etowah County is a covered jurisdiction under the Act, see supra note 52, all
voting changes must be precleared.
65. Presley, 112 S. Ct. at 825.
66. Brief for Appellants at 8,Presley (No. 90-711) (quoting Road Supervision Resolution
at 5-6). The other new commissioner, Billy Ray Williams, who is white, was placed in charge
of the county's Engineering Department. Id.
67. Presley, 112 S.Ct. at 825-26.
68. Id.
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County dispute, also designed to remedy minority vote dilution by
changing from an at-large to a district system.6 9 The following year,
with their votes no longer dispersed among the county at large, voters in
the two majority-black districts elected the county's first black commissioners "inmodem times." 7 The two black commissioners, Nathaniel
Gosha, III, and Ed Peter Mack, then challenged a 1979 law transferring
all authority for county road projects from the commission to its appointee, the county engineer. 7' Before this change to a so-called Unit
System, each Russell County commissioner had enjoyed autonomy over
spending his own district's road funds, just as the Etowah commissioners
had prior to the Common Fund Resolution. 72 Gosha and Mack alleged
that the 1979 law shifted power from an elected official to an appointed
one and therefore should have been precleared under section five.73
Plaintiff Presley and his Russell County counterparts in their consolidated complaint in district court alleged that these three resolutions

were changes "with respect to voting," and that Etowah and Russell
Counties therefore had violated the Voting Rights Act by falling to
preclear them.74 In a split decision, the three-judge court held that Etowah County's Common Fund Resolution and Russell County's change
to a Unit System were not subject to federal preclearance. 7 s Because
Etowah County's Road Supervision Resolution had the potential to reduce substantially the electoral influence of voters in the two new districts, however, the court said it should have been precleared.7 6
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that only changes bearing "a direct relation to voting" are
subject to the Act's preclearance requirement." In the majority's view,
the Etowah and Russell County changes involved only internal transfers
of power among officials, not rules governing voting, and so were not
covered by section five.7a Justice Kennedy, writing for six members of
the Court 7 9 began his analysis by expressly affirming the expansive scope
69. Sumbry v. Russell County, Civil Action No. 84-T-1386-E (M.D. Ala. Mar. 17, 1985).
70. Presley, 112 S. Ct. at 827.
71. Id. at 826.
72. Id.; see supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
73. Brief for Appellants at 11, Presley (No. 90-711).
74. Jurisdictional Statement for the Appellant at A-2, Presley (No. 90-711).
75. Id. at A-18-20.
76. Id. at A-20-21. Because the district court ruled in favor of appellants on this first
resolution, it was not before the Supreme Court. Presley, 112 S.Ct. at 826.
77. Presley, 112 S.Ct. at 832.
78. Id. at 830-31.
79. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Souter, and Thomas joined
Justice Kennedy's opinion. Id. at 824.

1993]

VOTING RIGHTS

afforded section five in the Court's previous cases."' He referred specifically to the four categories of changes"1 held subject to preclearance in
Allen v. State Board of Elections.12 While noting that the Allen categories
span a wide spectrum, he emphasized that they shared a common denominator: "a direct relation to voting and the election process."8' 3 Etowah County's Common Fund Resolution, by contrast, implicated only
"the internal operations of an elected body ' 8 4 and thus lacked the requisite direct relation to voting.
The United States Attorney General joined the case as an appellant
to argue that the changes at issue were subject to preclearance. 5 While
great deference ordinarily is afforded to the Attorney General's interpretation of the statute, the Court chose to emphasize the limits of that deference.8 6 Only when congressional intent is unsettled does the Court owe
deference to the Attorney General's construction. 7 Since the Court
found section five unambiguous in limiting its coverage to rules governing voting, it felt no compulsion to defer to the administrative
position. 8
The appellants had argued that Etowah County's Common Fund
Resolution was linked to voting. They reasoned that, by decreasing the
power of each individual commissioner, every vote for that commissioner
had been diluted.8 9 The Court never addressed directly the validity of
this argument; rather, it rejected the appellants' interpretation because of
its alleged impracticability. 90 According to the majority, without some
"workable standard" to define rules governing voting the scope of section
five would expand indefinitely, because "in a real sense every decision
taken by government implicates voting."9 1 In order to avoid holding
every governmental action subject to section five, the Court excluded
from preclearance "changes which affect only the distribution of power
among officials." 92
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 827.
Id. at 828; see infra notes 137-40 and accompanying text.
393 U.S. 544, 550-53 (1969). For a discussion of Allen, see infra notes 135-45.
Presley, 112 S. Ct. at 829.

84. Id.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
among

Id. at 831.
See NAACP v. Hampton County Election Comm'n, 470 U.S. 166, 178-79 (1985).
Presley, 112 S. Ct. at 831.
Id. at 832.
Id.
Id. at 829.
Id.
Id. at 830. Note the irony of this exclusion: Just such a reallocation of authority
officials-the Voting Rights Act-first gave the Supreme Court jurisdiction over state
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In considering the Russell County claim, the Court conceded that
the change to the Unit System was in some respects analogous to the

fourth category of voting changes identified in Allen, the replacement of
an elected official with an appointed one.9 3 Justice Kennedy distinguished the two situations, however, on the grounds that the Unit System
did not prohibit voters "'from electing an officer formerly subject to
the[ir] approval.'

"9'

Rather, the Russell County resolution effected only

a transferof authority from an elected official to an appointed one; it did

not abolish the elective office altogether. 95 The majority recognized that

these internal changes may reduce an elected official's power, but held
that such "routine matters of governance" were not covered by section
five.9 6 Justice Kennedy concluded the Court's opinion by emphasizing

that the Voting Rights Act was drafted to fight "specific evils" and
should not be stretched beyond recognition to cover all manner and
method of discrimination. 97
Justice Stevens, who was joined in dissent by Justices White and

Blackmun, 98 pointed to prior holdings by federal courts that similar

changes in the power of elected officials did indeed fall within the scope

of section five.9 9 The dissent cited eight instances in which the Department of Justice denied approval for reallocations of authority among offielection laws. Clearly such reallocations can have a tremendous impact on voting. See South
Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 355-62 (1966) (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
93. Presley, 112 S. Ct. at 830; see infra note 140 and accompanying text.
94. Presley, 112 S.Ct. at 830 (quoting Allen v. State Bd. of Election, 393 U.S. 544, 570
(1969)).
95. Id. The Court expressly refused to consider whether a reallocation of authority could
ever constitute "a de facto replacement of an elective office with an appointive one" and therefore be covered by § 5 because such facts were not before the Court. Id. at 831.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 832 ("The Voting Rights Act is not an all-purpose antidiscrimination statute.").
98. Id. (Stevens, J.,dissenting).
99. Robinson v. Alabama State Dep't of Educ., 652 F. Supp. 484, 486 (M.D. Ala. 1987)
(holding subject to preclearance a transfer of power from a body elected by the county at large
to one appointed by the city council); County Council of Sumter County v. United States, 555
F. Supp. 694, 701 (D.D.C. 1983) (holding subject to preclearance a law transferring power

from governor and general assembly to a county council elected by county voters at large);
Horry County v. United States, 449 F. Supp. 990, 997 (D.D.C. 1978) (holding subject to
preclearance a statute changing offices from appointive to elective).
Early in the history of the Act, the federal courts recognized the importance of § 5 in
deterring such indirect methods of reducing black electoral influence. For a catalogue of cases
from the early 1970s holding that internal transfers of authority are subject to preclearance, see
U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT: TEN YEARS AFTER 168-72
(1975).
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cials." °° Justice Stevens also referred to preclearance statistics from the
Attorney General tending to show that covered jurisdictions' routine

seeking of preclearance for reallocations of decision-making authority
did not unduly burden their ability to govern efficiently. 10 '
Justice Stevens then traced the interpretation of section five from its
beginnings, with a "narrow literal construction,""1 2 to its gradual expansion to encompass changes which bore a more tangential relation to voting."°3 In the dissent's view, the history of section five "reveal[s] a
continuous process of development in response to changing conditions in
the covered jurisdictions."" ° As covered jurisdictions devised new ways
to minimize black electoral influence, the Court had expanded section
five to meet the latest barriers. The courts and the Department of Justice
had not applied the preclearance requirement mechanically to a discrete
list of voting procedures, according to Justice Stevens, but instead had
taken into consideration "'the reality of changed practices as they affect
Negro voters.' "105 Furthermore, the legislative history of the amendments to the Act manifested, in Justice Stevens' view, clear congressional
approval of the courts' expansive interpretation. 10 6
Despite these statistical and historical assurances, Justice Stevens
nevertheless responded to the majority's fears of an unchecked expansion
of section five by offering some practical guidelines that the Court believed were missing.10 7 He suggested that reallocations of authority
should be subject to section five at least in cases where a black person has
just been elected pursuant to a consent decree designed to increase minority representation, as had occurred in Etowah County.10° Such a test
would provide the bright-line standard that the majority demanded while
enabling the Court here to rule in favor of the Etowah County appellants.10 9 Justice Stevens offered a different standard to cover the Russell
100. Presley, 112 S.Ct. at 833 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting). The changes denied preclearance were similar to those in the cases cited by Justice Stevens. See supra note 99.
101. Presley, 112 S.Ct. at 833 (Stevens, J., dissenting). For example, in a recent year the
Department of Justice approved 99% of the 17,000 preclearance requests it received without

unduly delaying enactment of the legislation involved. Id. at 833-34 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
102. Id. at 835 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
103. Id. at 834-37 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see infra notes 122-63 and accompanying text.

104. Presley, 112 S.Ct. at 834 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 836 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526,
531 (1973)).
106. Id. at 837-38 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see infra notes 146-51 and accompanying text.
107. Presley, 112 S.Ct. at 839-40 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 839 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
109. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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County case: I1 ° When a majority votes to transfer power from a district
representative to a person or entity controlled by the majority, the potential for a significant dilution of constituents' voting power is clear enough
to require preclearance.' 1 '
A brief examination of several United States Supreme Court voting
rights cases in the years leading up to the passage of the Voting Rights
Act in 1965 offers some perspective on the Court's most recent construction of section five.112 In Gomillion v. Lightfoot," 3 decided in 1960, the
Court first upheld a Fifteenth Amendment challenge to an indirect denial
of the right to vote, as opposed to the more direct frontal barriers traditionally employed by whites, such as poll taxes, literacy tests, and fraud
in counting votes. I1 4 The city of Tuskegee, Alabama redrew its municipal boundaries so as "to remove from the city all save only four or five of
its 400 Negro voters while not removing a single white voter or
resident."1 1 5
The city called into question the Court's authority to rule on the
issue, claiming a virtually unrestricted right of the states to reorganize
their political subdivisions. 16 The Court recognized the state's power,
but held that a state could not exercise that power in violation of the
Fifteenth Amendment: "When a State exercises power wholly within the
domain of state interest, it is insulated from federal judicial review. But
such insulation is not carried over when state power is used as an instrument for circumventing a federally protected right."1 17 Recognizing that
seemingly innocuous and routine governmental functions could deny
black suffrage, the Gomillion Court reaffirmed that "'[tihe [Fifteenth]
Amendment nullifies sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes of

discrimination.'

,,118

After Gomillion, the Court in the next few years issued several decisions which recognized other bases besides redistricting on which a voting rights challenge could be brought. For example, a series of cases
110. The dissent's first standard would not apply to Russell County because the transfer of
authority was made before the entry of the consent decree. Id. at 826.
111. Id. at 839-40 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
112. For two excellent general discussions of Supreme Court voting rights decisions before
the Act's enactment, see DERRICK A. BELL, JR., RACE, RACISM, AND AMERICAN LAW 190200 (3d ed. 1992) and Davidson, supra note 20, at 30-32.
113. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
114. See BELL, supra note 112, at 190-96.
115. Gomillion, 364 U.S. at 341. The law changed the shape of the city from a perfect
square to "an uncouth twenty-eight sided figure." Id. at 340.
116. Id. at 342.
117. Id. at 347.
118. Id. at 342 (quoting Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 275 (1939)).
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considered the discriminatory effect of legislative malapportionment and
concluded that when some districts are much more heavily populated
than others, the votes of citizens in districts with large populations are
unconstitutionally diluted." 9 Further, in Fortson v. Dorsey, 2 ° decided

the year the Voting Rights Act was passed, the Court held that multimember state senatorial districts could be unconstitutional if they operated "to minimize or cancel out the voting strength of racial or political"
groups.12 ' These cases suggest that by the time the Act was enacted in
1965, the Court understood the right to vote to encompass far more than

the mere ability to cast a ballot.
The history of the Voting Rights Act in the federal courts might
lead one to expect a different result in Presley. As Justice Stevens pointed

out in his dissent, the ambit of section five has expanded steadily since
1965.122 Only a year after its enactment, the United States Supreme
Court first considered the constitutionality of selected portions of the
Act, including the preclearance requirement, in South Carolina v. Kat-

zenbach.123 South Carolina challenged Congress's authority to require
federal approval of proposed state laws, claiming that section five violated the Tenth Amendment' 2 4 by encroaching on powers reserved to the
states.125 The Court responded that the states' power to violate the Fifteenth Amendment is nowhere protected in the Constitution: "The gist
of the matter is that the Fifteenth Amendment supersedes contrary exer-

tions of state power." 126
119. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 568-71 (1964) (holding legislative apportionment violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it diluted
the votes of residents of districts with large populations); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 37981 (1963) (holding that the Fifteenth Amendment prohibits dilution of votes on the basis of
race); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 237 (1962) (holding legislative apportionment justiciable).
120. 379 U.S. 433 (1965).
121. Id. at 439.
122. Presley, 112 S.Ct. at 834-37 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
123. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
124. The Tenth Amendment provides that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or
to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
125. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 323. Another basis for the § 5 challenge was that
preclearance violated Article III by empowering the District Court for the District of Columbia to issue advisory opinions. The Court concluded that review by the district court does not
constitute an advisory opinion. Since the Act suspends any new voting regulation, the Court
reasoned, the state or subdivision that enacted it has "a concrete and immediate 'controversy'
with the Federal Government." Id. at 335.
South Carolina also attacked other sections of the Act on the grounds that it denied due
process, was a bill of attainder, and violated the principles of separation of powers and equality
between the states. Id. at 323.
126. Id. at 325.
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Recognizing that section five seriously implicated the coequal status

of the state and federal governments, 127 the Katzenbach Court took great
pains to emphasize the extraordinary circumstances that necessitated so
drastic a remedy as preclearance. 128 The Court catalogued the painfully
slow and inefficient case-by-case approach to voting rights that had preceded the Act.12 9 The Court also noted that states hostile to minority
political participation had easily stayed one step ahead of the law by en-

acting new discriminatory rules as soon as old ones were struck down. It
was only "[u]nder the compulsion of these unique circumstances," 130 the
Court explained, that Congress enacted the federal preclearance
requirement.

In dissent, Justice Black's primary constitutional objection was that
through the Act's preclearance requirement the United States was usurp-

ing power from the states in flagrant violation of the Tenth Amendment."3 By requiring federal approval before a state can enforce its
laws, he maintained, section five "so distorts our constitutional structure
of government as to render any distinction drawn in the Constitution
between state and federal power almost meaningless." 13' 2 Congress's
power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment, 3 3 he believed, does not en-

compass such a shift of power from the states to the federal
134

government.
Three years after Katzenbach the Court issued in Allen v. State
Board of Elections 135 its principal opinion defining the scope of voting
changes subject to section five preclearance. Allen consolidated four separate claims; the Court found the disputed change in each subject to
preclearance. 136 The four broad categories held by the Court to require
127. Id.
128. Id. at 313-15.
129. Id
130. Id. at 335.
131. See id. at 358-61 (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
132. Id. at 358 (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
133. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2.
134. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 357-58 (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Justice Black also disputed whether the preclearance requirement created a case or controversy so as not to violate Article III. The Court, he said, was manipulating the established
meaning of "case or controversy" to find one where none really existed. Id. (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
135. 393 U.S. 544 (1969).
136. Id. at 572. Although the Act is silent on the issue, the Court also held that a private
litigant (as well as the Attorney General) may seek a declaratory judgment in a district court
that a proposed rule is covered by § 5. Id. at 554-55. This right was codified in the 1975
amendments to the Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973a(b) (1988).
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preclearance included: (1) changes in the manner of voting, 137 (2) mod138
ifications in the qualifications and requirements for candidacy,
(3) switching from district to at-large elections, 139 and (4) replacing an
elected office with an appointed one.1 4°
To justify placing these changes under the umbrella of section five,
the Allen Court emphasized the broad sweep of the Act, dismissing the
notion that section five was limited to the literal act of vothig or registering to vote. 141 Rather, the Court stressed that the Act was intended "to
reach any state enactment which altered the election law of a covered
State in even a minor way." 42 It "was aimed at the subtle, as well as the

obvious, state regulations" that deny blacks their right to vote. 143 Further, the Court held that a change which merely dilutes voting power is
subject to section five just as surely as a direct denial of the right to

vote. 1" Allen's expansive view has served as the touchstone for all subse-

1 45
quent courts' attempts to define the scope of section five.
The United States Supreme Court's expansive construction of sec-

137. Allen, 393 U.S. at 570. The change relaxed standards for determining the validity of
write-in votes. Illiterate voters had attempted to vote using preprinted labels. Their votes
were not counted because the new standards did not authorize this method of casting write-in
ballots. Id. at 553. Although the change probably would have increased the black vote count,
the Court restricted its role to determining only whether a voting procedure had changed, not
whether the new procedure was in fact discriminatory. Id. at 570.
138. Id The proposed change made it more difficult for an independent candidate to run
in a general election by requiring that no one who votes in a primary election may run as an
independent candidate in the general election, and by substantially increasing the number of
signatures required for the independent candidate's qualifying petition. Id at 551.
139. Id. at 569. The 1966 amendment to the Mississippi Code provided that "the board of
supervisors of each county may adopt an order providing that board members be elected at
large by all qualified electors of the county." Id. at 550. Before the amendment, all counties
elected members of the board of supervisors on a district basis. Id.
140. Id. at 569-70. Another 1966 amendment to the Mississippi Code required the board
of education to appoint the superintendent of education. Id. at 551. Prior to the amendment,
counties had the option of making the position of superintendent an elective or appointive
office. Id.
141. Id. at 565-68.
142. Id. at 566.
143. Id. at 565.
144. Id. at 569. This reasoning follows logically from the "denying and abridging" language in the Act and in the Fifteenth Amendment, although the Court does not expressly state
this connection. See U.S. CONST. amend. XV (emphasis added) (requiring that "[t]he right...
to vote shall not be denied or abridged ...on account of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude"); 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1988) (ensuring that voting changes do not "have the purpose
and will not have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or
color").
145. For other voting-related changes subsequently held by the United States Supreme
Court to require preclearance, see City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 160-61 (1980)
(changing residency requirements for candidates); City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S.
358, 368 (1975) (altering municipal boundaries); Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 532
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tion five in Allen met with congressional approval when the time came to
extend the Act. The legislative response to Allen and other decisions in
the Court's initial section five cases indicates that Congress intended that
the preclearance requirement be applied as broadly as possible. For example, the Senate Report accompanying the 1975 amendments to the
Act refers approvingly to the "broad interpretations"' 1 46 given to section
five by the Court in Allen. It quotes Katzenbach's 4 7 conclusion that
Congress was justified in adopting the preclearance requirement to combat the "'extraordinary stratagem[s]'" of recalcitrant white majorities,
and emphasizes the importance of section five in fulfilling the promise of
the Act.1 48 The report summarizes the purpose of the preclearance requirement as "insur[ing] that any future practices of these jurisdictions
be free of both discriminatory purpose and effect." ' 49 The report also
refers to dilution of minority voting strength as a change subject to
preclearance, in accordance with the Allen Court.'5 0
When the Act was again before Congress for extension in 1982, a
Senate report explained how the targets of section five had changed since
1965:
Following the dramatic rise in registration, a broad array of
dilution schemes were employed to cancel the impact of the

new black vote . .

.

. The ingenuity of such schemes seems

endless. Their common purpose and effect has been to offset
the gains made at the ballot box under the Act.
Congress anticipated this response. The preclearance provisions of Section five were designed to halt such efforts.'-"
Such comments illustrate that Congress approved the expansive construction first placed on section five by the Court in Allen, and that it
intended section five to proscribe whatever new discriminatory schemes
might arise in the future.
Despite Congress's apparent intention that the Act receive liberal
interpretation, the Court imposed its first significant limitation on section
five as early as 1976 in Beer v. United States.'I 2 The Court held that if a
(1973) (enacting reapportionment and redistricting plans); Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379,
387 (1971) (changing location of polling places).
146. S. REP. No. 295, supra note 44, at 16, reprintedin 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 782.
147. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).

148. S. REP. No. 295, supranote 44, at 15, reprintedin 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 781 (quoting
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 335 (1966)).
149. Id
150. Id. at 16, reprintedin 1975 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 782.
151. S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177,
183.
152. 425 U.S. 130 (1976). In Beer, the city of New Orleans sought preclearance of a reap-
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proposed change augments minority voter participation, even though it
15 3
may still have some discriminatory effect, it cannot violate section five.
The change at issue in Beer improved the lot of minority voters from bad
to "not-as-bad." Nevertheless, a group of black voters claimed that the
change was subject to section five because the new rule itself would be
discriminatory, 154 notwithstanding that it was less discriminatory than

what it replaced. The Court rejected this reasoning, asserting that
changes are judged under section five relative to what they replace, and

not in absolute terms. 155 Thus, section five applies only to changes that
would lead to a relative retrogression in minority voting."5 6
In its next section five case, Dougherty County Board of Education v.
White, 157 however, the Court reaffirmed its expansive interpretation of
the Act. The Court held that a board of education's rule requiring its
employees to take unpaid leave while seeking public offioe was a "standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting" and therefore required preclearance.1 58 The Court likened the requirement to a filing fee,

focusing on its actual electoral effects rather than its nominal form as a
personnel rule. 159 The Court concluded that the rule, although only indirectly related to voting, had as substantial an effect on the political process as some of the direct changes that Congress and the Court
previously had held subject to preclearance. 16 0 In considering whether

the board's rule had the potential for discrimination, 16 1 the Court did not
limit its scrutiny to the language of the rule itself, but looked beyond it to
portionment plan that would have increased black voting strength. Id. at 135-36. The United
States Attorney General refused to preclear the plan on the grounds that the new reapportion-

ment was nonetheless discriminatory because it diluted black votes. Id. at 136.
153. Id. at 141. The Court's caveat was that this rule held true only so long as the proposed change did not otherwise violate the Constitution. Id.
154. Id. at 136-38.
155. Id. at 141.
156. Id. Justice Marshall, dissenting, traced the Act's historical connection to the Fifteenth Amendment to argue that § 5 shares the absolute constitutional standard of denial or
abridgement. Id. at 146-49 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Thus the proper test for a proposed
voting rule, he asserted, is whether it may in fact discriminate, not simply whether it improves
upon what it replaces. Id. at 153 (Marshall, J., dissenting). He further asserted that the language of the statute unambiguously called for an absolute standard and left no room for the
Court's inference of "retrogression." Id. at 149-50 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
157. 439 U.S. 32 (1978).
158. Id. at 42. A second holding in Dougherty was that the board of education, although it
did not control elections, was a "political subdivision" for purposes of the Act. Id. at 44-45.
159. Id. at 40.
160. Id. at 41.
161. When a change is claimed to be subject to § 5, the test that the Supreme Court or the
three-judge district court applies is whether the proposal has the potential for discrimination.
See Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 383-85 (1971). It is important to remember that in so
doing the Court is not upholding or striking down the rule; it is merely deciding whether it
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The Court concluded that it should not

limit section five to a discrete or predetermined set of changes, but should
adapt it to meet whatever obstacles stand in the way of minority political
participation. Congress, the Court said, intended to preclear "all potentially discriminatory enactments whose source and forms it could not
anticipate but whose impact on the electoral process could be
significant."16' 3
There are several ways of interpreting Presley's place within the
Court's section five jurisprudence. Perhaps the most straightforward is
to take the Court's opinion at face value. The gist of the Court's opinion
is logically satisfying in its simplicity: The Voting Rights Act speaks
only to voting."' The Presley Court expressly affirms section five's expansive scope as to voting, 6 5 but simply refuses to extend that scope to
include internal transfers of authority. It is not a strained argument to
maintain that the changes involved in Presley were significantly farther
removed from voting than changes previously held subject to
preclearance under the Act. 66 Presley, after all, did not narrow the scope
of section five, it merely refused to expand it beyond its reasonable statutory meaning. Although this argument's reliance on plain meaning has a
facial appeal, it is ultimately unsatisfying because it does not address "the
' 67
reality of changed practices as they affect Negro voters."'
A second analysis of Presley, by contrast, roughly tracks the argument set out by Justice Stevens in his dissent; namely, that the holding is
directly inconsistent with the Court's own history of expansive construc-

tion of section five. 168 By tracing the gradual expansion of section five
coverage, 169 one could reasonably conclude that, in fact, reallocations of
power are simply the latest in a line of voting-related changes that must
be precleared. Even if one accepts that the Act, passed soon after the
violence in Selma and President Johnson's address, may have had as its
must be precleared by the Attorney General or the District Court for the District of Columbia.
Id.
162. Dougherty, 439 U.S. at 40-42. In this case, the principal circumstance counseling in
favor of a preclearance requirement was the fact that the rule was adopted less than a month
after the first black in recent years filed for candidacy. Id. at 34. Apart from studying the rule
itself, the Court sought to determine whether "the circumstances surrounding its adoption and
its effect on the political process are sufficiently suggestive of the potential for discrimination to
demonstrate the need for preclearance." Id. at 42.
163. Id. at 47.

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Presley, 112 S. Ct. at 832.
Id. at 827-28.
See supra notes 137-40 and accompanying text.
Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 531 (1973).
See Presley, 112 S. Ct. at 834-38 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
See supra notes 122-63 and accompanying text.
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immediate goal a simple increase in black registration,1 70 it soon moved

on to new challenges once it had largely succeeded in that fundamental
first step. The Allen Court recognized that once registration had solidifled, the battle then focused on dilution schemes,17 1 and the Court held
these changes equally subject to preclearance. In Presley, Justice Stevens
contends that once dilution is brought under control and blacks are

elected, the next step is to prevent blacks from being stripped of
power.1 72 Justice Stevens supports his assertion that in fact such a shift

in section five's interpretation has already occurred in the federal courts

by highlighting a series of decisions173in which transfers of power had been

held to constitute voting changes.
Evidence of this historical inconsistency becomes apparent when

one compares Presley to the reasoning of the Court in Dougherty County
Board of Education v. White,174 in which the change at issue arguably
was not directly related to voting. 175 Nonetheless, the Dougherty Court
held that the change required preclearance because it was able to trace
the change, albeit indirectly, to voting. 176 Under this analysis Dougherty
can be said to stand for the proposition that changes indirectly affecting
voting, of which a reallocation of authority is one, are subject to section
five. 177
Under this broad view of section five expounded by Justice Stevens
in his dissent, the Presley Court's conclusion that Etowah County's Com-

mon Fund Resolution was not a change with respect to voting is an un170. For the view that this was Congress' only intention, and that § 5 never should have
been extended beyond this narrow goal, see ABIGAIL M. THERNSTROM, WHOSE VOTES
COUNT: AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS 236-37 (1987). Her book

begins, "The Voting Rights Act of 1965 had a simple aim: providing ballots for southern
blacks." Id. at 11.
171. See Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 569 (1969). Dilution schemes are
practices that do not prevent black voting per se, but disperse the black vote to prevent black
candidates from winning office. See generally JOINT CENTER FOR POLITICAL STUDIES, MINORITY VOTE DILUTION 4-5 (Chandler Davidson ed., 1984) (outlining the essential aspects of
vote dilution schemes).
172. Presley, 112 S. Ct. at 838-39. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
173. Id. at 833 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see supra note 99 (citing instances of the Court's
application of the preclearance requirement to cases involving transfers of power among
officials).
174. 439 U.S. 32 (1978).
175. Id at 34. The change involved the board of education's adoption of a rule requiring
candidates for public office to take leave without pay. Id The other indirect link to voting in
Dougherty was the Court's conclusion that the board of education was a "political subdivision"
because its rule could affect candidacy, although it had no direct link to voting or elections.
Id. at 43-46.
176. Id. at 41-43.
177. Of course, this is a proposition that Presley flatly rejects. Presley, 112 S. Ct. at 832.
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warranted elevation of form over substance. The practical effects of the
change constitute exactly the type of discrimination that section five has
been construed previously to preempt. Allen recognized the discriminatory effect of switching from district to at-large voting"'8 and held that
such a change was subject to preclearance. "79 Since that decision, indirect dilutive changes, such as the district-to-at-large switch, have comprised the vast majority of objections lodged by the Attorney General. 8
Yet just such a change, only one step removed, was denied section
five coverage in Presley. The Etowah County consent decree prohibited
at-large election to the county commission, thus creating a black-majority district from which Lawrence Presley was elected."8 ' Although they
could no longer maintain their at-large advantage directly, the white majority achieved largely the same result by instituting the change within
the commission instead of at the electoral level. By looking at the Etowah County Commission as a mini-electorate, the relevance to section
five of the two resolutions is thrown into sharp relief. Before passage of
the two resolutions, the commission's internal "elections"--decisions on
how to spend the road funds-were made on a district basis.'
The
"electorate" of each district (its commissioner) decided how and when to
spend the road money allocated to it. The commission's two resolutions,
however, changed this district system to an at-large one. Under the new
system, the entire "electorate" (the full commission), with its white majority, enjoyed electoral control over spending in all the districts, including the majority-black one (Commissioner Presley's seat). 18 3 Thus,
Etowah County, having failed to retain an at-large general election, simply imposed the at-large system on the commission itself, thereby effectively circumventing the intended results of the consent decree. In
establishing its rigid definition of voting, the Presley Court turned a blind
eye toward the commission's subterfuge.
The holding in the Russell County case works in much the same
178. A simple example illustrates the discriminatory potential of a switch from district to
at-large voting. Suppose a county as a whole is 75% white and 25% black. It is divided into
four districts, one of which has a black majority of 70%. When voting is by district, blacks
have the electoral strength to select one of the four county commissioners. When voting is
conducted at-large (i.e., countywide, without regard for district lines), the overall white majority will control each of the four seats.
179. Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 569 (1969).
180. HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Civil and ConstitutionalRights of the Comm. on the
Judiciary,House of Representatives, on Extension of the Voting Rights Act, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 3, at 2243-44 (1981).
181. Presley, 112 S.Ct. at 825.
182. Id.
183. Brief for Appellants at 7-9, Presley (No. 90-711).
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manner to circumvent the requirement of preclearance in changes to atlarge elections. Under Russell County's Unit System, the county engineer, appointed by majority vote of the commission, assumed all responsibilities for county road work.18 4 The Presley Court found that this
change did not fit into the second Allen category because it did not abolish an elective office. Furthermore, the Court reasoned, the reduction of

the commissioners' power was not a de facto abolition because the commission "retain[ed] substantial authority, including the power to appoint
the county engineer."" 5 The Court failed to recognize that while the
commission as a whole retains that power, the Unit System is a de facto
abolition of most of the power of the two new black commissioners. Just
as in Etowah County, individual control over district road funds has
been surrendered to the white majority.
The change from district to at-large voting can have the same effect
on minority participation whether the change occurs at the level of the
citizen or at the level of the elected official. The Presley Court offers no
convincing reason why the Voting Rights Act should allow a covered
jurisdiction to let in through the back door what it bars through the
front. The lesson is clear for jurisdictions that want to limit minority
influence: If you cannot dilute the votes of black citizens themselves, you
can simply dilute the vote of the representative they elect. The relation
to voting should be clear to the Court-both resolutions stripped the majority-black districts of any electoral influence over road operations, "the
most important aspect of county governance."'8 6 The practical effect of
the changes challenged in Presley is to reestablish the preconsent decree
status quo in both counties.' 7 In other words, any black influence over
road matters is once again subject to the county's white majority, just as
it had been before blacks were elected to the commissions.
If, as the preceding analysis suggests, Presley has in fact arrested the
sweep of section five short of the kinds of indirect voting changes existing
in Etowah and Russell Counties, minorities will be forced to look elsewhere for their remedy. One possible answer to potentially discriminatory transfers of power would be to amend the Voting Rights Act to
184. Presley, 112 S. Ct. at 826. This is not a new tactic. For example, in 1877, when
Reconstruction enfranchisement threatened to give North Carolina blacks significant electoral
power, the state legislature passed the "County Government Act," which empowered the legislature to appoint justices of the peace, who in turn appointed the county commissioners. Thus,
the counties with large black populations were controlled by the white-majority legislature.
DONALD

N.

BROWN, SOUTHERN AiTITUDEs TOWARD NEGRO VOTING IN THE BOURBON

1877-1890, at 131-32 (1960) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Oklahoma).
185. Presley, 112 S.Ct. at 831.
186. Jurisdictional Statement for the Appellant at A-20, Presley (No. 90-711).
187. See supra notes 55-68 and accompanying text.
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make such changes explicitly subject to section five scrutiny. Such an
amendment could in effect codify the standard proposed by Justice Ste-

vens in his Presley dissent. Justice Stevens would subject to preclearance
any reallocation of authority among elected officials that occurs "(1) after the victory of a black candidate, and (2) after the entry of a consent

decree" designed to remedy minority vote dilution. 188 So as not to intrude unnecessarily into state and local autonomy, preclearance could be

strictly limited to the decisional rules of the legislative body, not its policy outcomes. 189 Such a statute could be drafted with enough precision
to avoid the line-drawing problems feared by the Presley majority.

A third analysis of the Court's decision in Presley, although not focusing on section five at all, may best explain why the Court held as it did
and what the decision may mean for future section five claims. To the

extent that Presley may be inconsistent with the case law and legislative
history of the Act, it may be more enlightening to consider the case as a
constitutional objection to section five than as a simple matter of statu-

tory construction. Although the references are muted, 9 ' the Presley
holding may rest implicitly on a view of federal-state relations similar to
that expressed by Justice Black in his dissent in South Carolinav. Katzenbach;19 ' namely, that the preclearance requirement unconstitutionally
usurps powers "reserved to the states."1 92 If a majority of the Court now
188. Presley, 112 S.Ct. at 839 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
189. Lani Guinier, No Two Seats: The Elusive Questfor PoliticalEquality, 77 VA. L. REV.
1413, 1510-11 (1991). Professor Guinier, who contributed to the appellants' brief in Presley,
has written at length about the inadequacy of a mere tally of black electoral victories as an
accurate measure of black influence on policy decisions. See also Drew S. Days, III & Lani
Guinier, Enforcement of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION
167, 171-76 (Chandler Davidson ed., 1984) (focusing on the extensions of the Act and the 1982
amendments to § 5); Lani Guinier, Voting Rights and Democratic Theory-Where Do We Go
From Here?, in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING: THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT IN PER-

SPECTIVE 283, 292 (1992) (arguing that the Voting Rights Act should promote "a substantive
measure of political equality," not mere access to the political system); Lani Guinier, The
Triumph of Tokenism: The Voting Rights Act and the Theory of Black Electoral Success, 89
MIcH. L. REV. 1077, 1101-34 (1991) (arguing that black electoral success alone will not guarantee a corresponding black influence on policy).
190. Indicative of the Presley Court's sensitivity to concerns of federalism are the following
statements: "If federalism is to operate as a practical system of governance and not a mere
poetic ideal, the States must be allowed both predictability and efficiency in structuring their
governments." Presley, 112 S. Ct. at 832. "[T]he constant adjustments required for the efficient governance of every covered State illustrate the necessity for us to formulate workable
rules to confine the coverage of section 5 . . . ." Id. at 830.
191. 383 U.S. 301, 358-61 (1966) (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
192. U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.") (emphasis added).
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harbors serious doubts about the constitutionality of section five, Presley
may begin to look much more understandable.
That this Tenth Amendment concern may have motivated the Presley Court is not without precedential basis. Evidence of the current
Court's views on this aspect of federalism can be found in recent United
93
States Supreme Court decisions in other areas. In Gregory v. Ashcroft,
for example, the Court relied heavily on the sanctity of state sovereignty
in refusing to enforce a federal statute in conflict with a Missouri
mandatory retirement law for judges. Although not doubting Congress's
power under the Supremacy Clause19 to legislate in areas of state law,19 '
the Court emphasized that the statutory language must make Congress's
196
intention to do so "unmistakably clear."
This concession to federal power was undercut seriously, however,
by the Court's own analysis of federalism which followed. 197 Remarking
that the framers intended the federal and state governments to balance
one another, the Gregory Court warned, "These twin powers will act as
mutual restraints only if both are credible." 1 98 The Court echoed Justice
Black's states'-rights concerns in Katzenbach by reiterating that "'j]ust
as "the Framers of the Constitution intended the States to keep for themselves, as provided in the Tenth Amendment, the power to regulate elections," ' "199 so also "'"[e]ach State has the power to prescribe the
qualifications of its officers and the manner in which they shall be chosen." ,,200 Such a statement flies directly in the face of the Voting
193. 111 S.Ct. 2395 (1991). For an even more recent example of the importance the current Court places on state sovereignty, see New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992),
decided five months after Presley. In New York, the Court struck down that part of the LowLevel Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-240, 99 Stat. 1842
(1985) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2021b et seq.), requiring states either to regulate the disposal of
low-level radioactive waste according to Congress' instructions or accept ownership of (and
liability for) it. New York, 112 S.Ct. at 2414. The Court held that the statute would unconstitutionally force the states to implement legislation enacted by Congress. Id. Using the classifying language of the Voting Rights Act, it added, in dicta, that "[s]tates are not mere political
subdivisions of the United States." Id. at 2434 (emphasis added).
194. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
195. Gregory, 111 S. Ct. at 2400.
196. Id. at 2401.
197. See id. at 2399-2400.
198. Id. at 2400. Justice Black expressed the same concern in his constitutional attack on
§ 5 in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 358-62 (1966) (Black, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part); see supra notes 131-34 and accompanying text.
199. Gregory, 111 S.Ct. at 2401 (quoting Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 647 (1973)
(quoting Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 124-25 (1970))).
200. Id. (quoting Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 647 (quoting Boyd v. Thayer, 143 U.S. 135, 161
(1892))). The mandatory retirement law for judges did not involve voting per se, but did affect
the prerequisites to holding state office, as in Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544,
570 (1969). See supra note 138. Such electoral authority, the Court said, "lies at' "the heart
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Rights Act, which expressly removes electoral control from covered
states.2" 1 It is surely relevant to note that some of the most vehement
opposition to both the Fifteenth Amendment and later to the Voting

Rights Act invoked states'-rights arguments.2 °2 Gregory, in a different
context, conveys essentially the same constitutional message as Justice
Black's in Katzenbach.20 3 Thus, there is at least some strong suggestion
that Presley, decided about six months later, was informed by many of

the same concerns for federalism set forth in detail in Gregory.2 4
If Presley is viewed in the constitutional light of Justice Black's Kat-

zenbach dissent and the current Court's expressed opinions on federal/
state relations, it is evident that statutory interpretation and legislative
history may not be determinative in the next section five case. The in-

quiry into the scope of change "with respect to voting '

205

may be only a

red herring to divert attention from the Court's antipathy, as expressed

in Gregory, to federal intrusion into state election law. Viewed in this
light, some of the Court's affirmations of liberal section five coverage in
Presley begin to ring hollow.

2 6

If the Court still genuinely adheres to the

constitutional decision reached in Katzenbach,2 °7 one wonders why it felt
compelled to arrest section five at the line it drew in Presley.
For example, if overburdening state and local governments 20 8 was
20 9
not a determinative factor in earlier cases, why should it be so now?
Similarly, if a personnel rule, indirectly related to voting, should be sub2 10
ject to preclearance in Dougherty County Board of Education v. White,

why should not Presley's internal transfer of authority, which also indirectly affects voting, be equally subject to review? Finally, if replacing an
of representative government."'"

Id. at 2402 (quoting Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 221

(1984)).
201. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1988) (stating that "no person shall be denied the right to vote for
failure to comply with" any voting change that has not been precleared).
202. On states' rights objections to the Fifteenth Amendment, see FONER, supra note 9, at
446-47. On objections to the Act, see Davidson, supra note 20, at 18.
203. 383 U.S. 301, 358-62 (1966) (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
204. All of the justices in the Presley majority who were seated on the Court when Gregory
was decided also joined Gregory's majority opinion. Justice Thomas had not yet joined the
Court when Gregory was decided.
205. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (1988).
206. See Presley, 112 S.Ct. at 827 (affirming Allen's "reject[ion of] a narrow construction,
one which would have limited § 5 to state rules prescribing who may register to vote").
207. 383 U.S. at 327-28.
208. Presley, 112 S.Ct. at 830.
209. See id. at 834 n.7 (Stevens, J., dissenting). After all, the sum of changes alreadyheld
subject to preclearance implicate a substantial portion of the duties of many small subdivisions.
The Court offers no evidence to show that the changes at issue in Presley would significantly
increase that burden.
210. 439 U.S. 32, 47 (1978).
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elected official with an appointed one is within the scope of section
five,"' why is a substantial transfer of the elected official's power not
similarly covered?2 12 Surely if the Court still fully accepts section five's
extraordinary alteration of federal/state relations, it would not have so
many qualms about infringing on states' rights.
This is not to suggest that section five is under any imminent danger
of being overturned on Tenth Amendment grounds. Indeed, nothing in
the Presley opinion indicates that the Court is eager to revive the constitutional objections to the Act that have been settled law since the Court's
decision in 1966, in South Carolinav. Katzenbach.21 3 On the other hand,
as long as the Court is unwilling to overturn the constitutional underpinnings of section five, it will never be able to offer a very convincing rationale for restraining its scope. After all, the constitutional justification
for the preclearance requirement rested in part on its being the only effec-

tive way to combat the "extraordinary stratagem[s] ' '214 of covered jurisdictions. Thus, by placing the latest "stratagem" beyond the reach of
section five, the Court has, perhaps not unwittingly, eroded the Act's

constitutional legitimacy.
After Presley, the Court is caught in a contradiction of its own making: It affirms the validity of federal preclearance authority, but at the
same time would restrain that power short of its goal. Such hamstringing frustrates the Act's congressional intent.2 1 5 Both the structure of the
Act and its legislative history evince an aggressive approach to combatting barriers to black political power. Section five for the first time allowed the federal government to take the offensive instead of waiting to
react piecemeal to every state action. The preclearance requirement cast
the Attorney General's net as widely as possible. To the Court's concerns about overburdening state and local governments, a dissenter could
reply that the Act was meant to be intrusive, to snoop into any action
that might threaten minority participation. If the Court has concerns
about intruding on state sovereignty, then perhaps it should reconsider
the constitutional justification for the Act; it should not instead place
artificial restrictions on the Act.
Because the appellants in Presley framed the issue as one of statu211. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
212. The Court answered that the official involved "retained substantial authority." Presley, 112 S.Ct. at 831. But by the same token, he also relinquishedsubstantial authority, and
the Court has noted that Congress intended "that all changes, no matter how small, be subjected to § 5 scrutiny." Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 568 (1969).
213. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
214. Id. at 335.
215. See supra notes 146-51 and accompanying text.
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tory interpretation, the Court was not obliged to address any constitutional motivations that may have informed its decision. The dissent also
proceeds along statutory lines by trying to force reallocations of authority into the mold of "voting." 2' 16 The dissent might have been better
served by calling the majority's bluff and acknowledging that Presley certainly is not about voting per se, but voting in the literal sense never was
the ultimate goal of the Voting Rights Act. Rather, the Act is properly
invoked in Presley because the change at issue had a strong smell of diminishing black political power, and minority empowerment-not
merely casting a ballot-lies at the very soul of the Act. The right to
vote, after all, is meaningless in itself. It is only the symbol of a political
voice. By focusing so narrowly on voting, the Presley Court failed to do
justice to the spirit of the Voting Rights Act.
ROBERT BRYSON CARTER

216. See Presley, 112 S. Ct. at 832-40 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

